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Abstract 
 
Modeling escalation of disputes constitutes a major cornerstone in international conflict 
studies.  Many of these studies assume that incidents in a dispute follow a regular path 
where use of force is preceded by lower levels of hostile action such as threat or display 
of force.  Therefore, these studies treat a dispute as having escalated if force was used.  
A close examination of the MID IP (Militarized Interstate Disputes Incident Level) 
dataset suggests inaccuracies may exist in this assumption. The MID IP dataset indicates 
that parties directly utilize force (i.e. without a preceding threat or display of force) in 
significant number of disputes. That about 40% disputes between 1993 and 2001 
directly start with use of force at the MID Onset level echoes warnings made by Diehl 
(2006) and Dixon (1993). We identify cases in which the first action of a dispute is use 
of force “direct escalations.” This thesis examines whether this discrepancy poses a 
threat to the validity of empirical tests of escalation models.  To that end, we replicate a 
comprehensive set of escalation models adopted from Braithwaite and Lemke (2011).  
More specifically, we compare the models with and without direct escalation cases in 
the sample of disputes. Results from Heckman selection models indicate that when 
direct escalations are excluded from the sample, being a joint democracy loses its 
pacifying effect for dyadic MID onset, although its pacifying effect increases for 
escalation of these disputes.  Therefore, we can say that if democratic dyads try to 
communicate before involving direct use of force, they might find peaceful resolutions 
for their problems even at the escalation level.  Further analysis suggests that territorial 
controversy and geographical contiguity significantly increase the likelihood of direct 
escalation. Finally, results also suggest that direct escalations may partially be an artifact 
of biased data collection; poorer/peripheral dyads carry a higher likelihood of 
experiencing a direct escalation. 
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Özet 
 
Uluslararası çatışma çalışmalarında anlaşmazlıkların kızışmasını modellemek çok 
önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Bu çalışmların çoğundaki modellemeler, anlaşmazlıklardaki 
olayların tehdit veya güç gösterisi gibi düşük seviylerden güç kullnımı veya savaş gibi 
daha ciddi seviyelere doğru düzenli bir yol izledikleri varsayımına dayanır. Halbuki 
MID-IP veri setindeki sonuçlar bu varsayımın çoğu zaman gözlemlenemediğini ortaya 
koymuştur. 1993-2001 yılları arasındaki askerileştirilmiş devletlerarası anlaşmazlıkların 
başlagıç düzeylerini baz alırsak, bu anlaşmazlıkların %40’ının direkt güç kullanımı gibi 
ciddi seviyelerde başladığını görmekteyiz. Bu empirik gözlem bize Diehl (2006) ve 
Dixon (1993) makalelerinde geçen yaygın varsayım üzerine olan uyarıları 
hatırlatmaktadır. Analizlerimizde direkt güç kullanımı ile başlayan anlaşmazlıklar 
“direkt kızışmalar” olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu tez varsayım ve gözlem arasındaki bu 
çelişkinin kızışma modellemelerindekiempirik testlerin geçerliliğini ne denli etkilediğini 
incelmektedir. Bu amaçla, kızışma modeli kullanan çalışmalar arasında kapsamlı ve 
güncel olarak gördüğümüz Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) makalesindeki modeli 
tekrarladık. Heckman seçim modeli sonuçları direkt kızışma ile başlayan anlaşmazlıkları 
örneklemden çıkardığımızda demokarasinin başlangıç safhasındaki anlaşmazlık azaltıcı 
etkisinin zayıfladığını, fakat ilerleyen seviyelerde kızışma azaltıcı etkisinin arttığını 
göstermektedir. Böylelikle, eğer demokratik devletler direkt güç kullanımı yerine daha 
barışçıl bir şekilde iletişime geçseler aralarındaki anlaşmazlık daha fazla kızışmadan 
çözülebilir diyebiliriz. Analiz sonuçlarımız ayrıca bölgesel uzlaşmazlıkların ve coğrafi 
yakınlığın direkt kızışma olasılığını artırıcı faktörler olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. 
Sonuçlarımıza göre direkt kızışmaların çok gözlemlenmesinin kısmi nedenlerinden biri 
de yanlı veri toplama olabileceğidir. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Modeling escalation processes of international disputes constitutes a major cornerstone in 
international conflict studies.  In both theoretical and empirical work, these studies tend to 
assume that incidents in a dispute follow a regular path where use of force is preceded by 
lower levels of hostile action such as threat or display of force.  Therefore, these studies treat 
a dispute as having escalated if force was used.  However, a close examination of the MID-
IP (Military Interstate Disputes Incident Data) dataset1 suggests that inaccuracies may exist 
in this assumption.  The MID-IP dataset indicates that states directly utilize force (i.e. 
without a preceding threat or display of force) in a significant number of disputes.  Those 
about more than 40% disputes between 1993 and 2001, at the MID Onset level, directly start 
with use of force as a beginning hostility level.  Very few studies warned regarding this 
possibility of direct use of force.  Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, none have 
incorporated this possibility in their empirical analyses.  This thesis gives a preliminary 
descriptive framework for the cases beginning with direct use of force and examines 
whether the discrepancy between what conflict studies have assumed and what we observed 
in MID-IP dataset poses a threat to the validity of empirical tests of escalation models.   
 
 
                                               
1 A “militarized incident is defined as a single military action involving an explicit threat, display, or use of 
force by one system member state towards another system member state”  (Ghosn et al., 2004). 
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1.1. Steps to War: Disaggregating Stages of Conflict 
Conflict constitutes the cornerstone of international relations studies, because conflict is 
seen as a steps-to-war process. Much of these studies historically have been focusing on the 
determinants of war.  With the 1990s, scholars have started looking at militarized conflicts 
that stop or otherwise end before they evolve into full-blown international wars.  Such a 
focus enabled scholars to a) look at many more cases, b) in a related way, got rid of the 
arbitrary definition of what distinguishes war from lower levels of international conflict, but 
also c) allowed scholars to gauge whether and how correlates of war and peace affect 
different stages of interstate conflict with respect to their onset, duration, severity and end. 
While the steps-to-war approach has immensely advanced our understanding of 
international conflict, two prominent scholars have briefly questioned the validity of the 
orderly, step by step escalation among conflict stages assumption. This thesis aims to 
elaborate on this questioning of the validity. Echoing Dixon (1993) and Diehl (2006), 
disputes may not follow their regular path, and interestingly may ignore the initiation phase 
altogether and immediately reach the level of use of force.  We call cases in which the first 
action of a dispute is use of force “direct escalations.”   
Achieving progress in clear understanding of escalation processes can be possible by 
extending the internal validity of the escalation concept.  In this thesis, to set the stage for 
future work on such matters, I offer a broad empirical analysis of direct escalations in which 
I scrutinize how they are characterized, what kind of causes triggers them, how they affect 
conventional empirical regression models in international conflict studies, and what main 
determinants of direct escalations are. 
 My argument is that if the previous studies tend to assume that incidents in a dispute 
follow a regular path where use of force is preceded by lower levels of hostile action such as 
threat or display of force, eliminating the direct escalation cases from the dataset should not 
change the impact of the conventional explanatory variables upon the escalation process.  To 
see whether my argument is valid, I will replicate one of the recent and comprehensive 
studies on escalation by including/excluding the direct escalation cases in regression models. 
The next section discusses the previous studies on escalation processes. Then, I 
conceptualize and describe direct escalations. In this section, I also present descriptive 
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analyses of escalations to see their frequency and geographical distribution vis-à-vis 
“regular” militarized interstate disputes.  In the same section, I also analyze escalation trends 
and outcomes of the disputes starting with the direct escalation.  Secondly, I focus on the 
determinants of the direct escalation.  Thirdly, I discuss the influence of the direct 
escalations in conventional regression models exploring causes of escalation through partly 
replicating Braithwaite and Lemke (2011), both with and without the cases of the direct 
escalations.  Finally, I conclude my thesis by describing what our findings suggest and how 
they might illuminate a way for future research, and empirical models testing escalation 
processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Escalation Theory 
Escalation process has been a central topic for interstate conflict studies for years.  In many 
of these studies, escalation process has been associated with arms races (Richardson, 1960; 
Intriligator and Brito, 1984), deterrence (Brams and Kilgour, 1987; Zagare, 1992), and 
escalation in war (Smoke, 1977; Wittman, 1979; Pillar, 1983), among a number of 
international crisis situations (Schelling, 1960, 1966; Holsti, 1972; Lebow, 1981; Leng, 
1980, 1993; Siverson and Miller, 1993; Brecher, 1994).  A crisis is usually characterized by 
two contending states, where both parties decide whether or not to use coercive pressure 
against an opponent (Lockhart, 1979).  The opponent, in turn (or simultaneously), decides to 
counter this coercion. This back and forth between the two parties eventually passes a 
threshold, above which the crises is defined as having escalated into a militarized conflict.  
Despite an extensive focus on the factors affecting states’ decisions whether or not to 
escalate, and outcomes of the escalation processes, very few studies, according to Carlson 
(1995), have dealt with systematic and theoretical framework to identify the kinds of 
escalation strategies which are more probably to adopt in conflict.   
Considerable part of the early research endeavored to answer the question of 
escalation process accompanied by the bargaining process (Schelling, 1960, 1966; Kahn, 
1965; Young, 1968; Snyder, 1972; Smoke, 1977).  According to  Schelling (1960, 1966), 
leading an opponent to take a step back by exploiting its fear about the future in case of 
further escalation is one of the impacts of escalation.  Determining factor here is the ability 
of tolerating risks (or imposed costs), which characterizes escalation process as a 
competitive risk taking game (Schelling, 1960; Kahn, 1965; Powell, 1987, 1988; Maoz, 
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1985, 1990; Geller, 1990).  However, under what conditions states select different levels of 
escalation to attain their goals throughout the bargaining process is weakly specified in a 
theoretical framework.   
Some of the case studies on escalation have directly attempted to identify the kinds 
of escalation strategies that actors apply in conflict (Ikle, 1971; Smoke, 1977; Snyder and 
Diesing, 1977; Pillar, 1983; Haig, 1984).  The main discussion of these studies is about what 
kinds of escalatory actions (low or high escalation) is more likely to render the opponent 
conceding. On the one hand the low escalatory actions have relatively low cost, and they 
might lead to counterescalation of the opponent by insufficient attempt to isolate the 
tolerance of the opponent for the escalation (Haig, 1984; Patchen, 1988).  On the other hand, 
despite their better chance to exceed the opponent’s cost threshold, high escalatory actions 
might bring some extra price for the unexpected concession which was quite unnecessary to 
secure the outcome (Bonoma, 1975).  Therefore, early literature does not seem to have a 
theoretical convergence on explaining escalation behavior. 
According to Synder and Diesing (1977), high escalation can more probably produce 
counterescalation than do a concession under specified conditions. Lockhart (1979) suggests 
that low levels of escalatory actions works for a state if it has less resources and if it 
identifies the issue of dispute as insignificant.  Brecher (1994), on the contrary, argues and 
shows that low and gradual escalatory behavior is more probable if a state has more 
resources than its opponent.   
Relative military capabilities of actors and the issue salience appear as two 
prominent factors affecting escalation behavior and patterns (Gochman and Leng, 1983; 
Gochman and Maoz, 1984; Siverson and Miller, 1993). Relative military capabilities are 
important because they function as the main way of imposing costs on an opponent in a 
crisis.  Although Brecher (1994) theoretically disagrees, many empirical studies show that 
parties with relatively equal capabilities are more likely to go to war with one another than 
are parties with disparate capabilities (Bremer, 1992; Werner and Lemke, 1996; Organksi 
and Kugler, 1980).  Additionally, many of the studies demonstrate that if the issue at stake is 
salient and parties highly value it, then they are more willing to escalate the dispute to the 
higher levels to impose a demand (Gochman and Leng, 1983; Maoz, 1983; Wilkenfeld, 
1991; Brecher, 1994; Hensel, 1996).  I will discuss the issue salience soon in detail. 
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One main reason for the inconsistency in the abovementioned findings may be due to 
the fact that research in conflict escalation is guided by different assumptions and different 
theoretical frameworks. Many of these studies lack rigorous theoretical framework 
specifying the key variables to interact and studying on the conditions leading states to 
choose different escalation patterns.  Moreover, these studies have focused on explaining the 
conditions under which states escalate to the extreme; for instance, a war.  However, 
preferences of states over escalation patterns remain unclear (Carlson, 1995).   
Using formal models to understand escalation processes elucidates how behavior and 
attitude of the parties change during crisis, and why weaker party does not always surrender 
against costs imposed by the stronger side.  Under specified conditions, a stronger party can 
misperceive its bargaining position and back down.  Alternatively, a weaker side can obtain 
what it wants by bluffing a willingness to tolerate the risks of escalation (Powell, 1987; 
Morrow, 1989; Lalman, 1990; Zagare, 1992).  
To sum, escalation strategy of the parties is mainly conditioned on two factors: a) 
party’s own perceptions of the other party’s capabilities, b) the issue at stake.  Manipulation 
over escalation rate that can be sent to the opponent can show how the parties are willing to 
bear escalation costs.  Although escalation causes costs on both parties, the logic is to make 
not being conceded more costly for the opponent (Cross, 1969; Pillar, 1983; Morgan, 1990, 
1994).  Escalation is one of the means to make a situation costly for the opponent. 
According to Schelling (1966) escalation is the coercive way of bargaining in which the 
future concerns of greater cost imposition leads states to give in. 
 
2.2. Factors Affecting Escalation Probability 
Before concluding this chapter I want to identify the most widely accepted explanatory 
variables affecting the likelihood of conflict escalation in various dimensions that the 
previous studies both theoretically and empirically demonstrated.  Firstly, democratic peace 
phenomenon has been one of the important parts of interstate conflict and escalation 
processes literature.  In their seminal research, Maoz and Abdolali (1989) claims that the 
likelihood of escalation to war is very low, or almost none, in conflict that the democratic 
states engaged in.  Some of the empirical research also verify this claim by using MID 
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hostility scale of jointly democratic dyads (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Hart and Reed, 1999).  
Most recently, Maoz (2008) shows that democracies inherently engage in militarized 
disputes with each other less than would be expected by chance meaning that an 
independent effect of political system type does still matter.  Moreover, Senese (1997) finds 
that the pacifying effect of being joint democracies is more visible at lower levels of conflict 
rather than higher ones. Once democracies pass the initial threshold and enter into a conflict, 
MIDs between democracies escalate to uses of force more frequently.  From a similar vein, 
Prins and Sprecher (1999) have demonstrated that the likelihood of MID reciprocation and 
escalation is higher for democratic targets when an initiator is a non-democratic.   
Some of the conflict literature has been devoted to explain the effects of domestic 
politics upon conflict and escalation processes through using different escalation measures 
(Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Schultz, 2001; Palmer et al., 2004; Partell, 1997; 
Fearon, 1994; Eyerman and Hart, 1996; Partell and Palmer, 1999).  Across each of these 
studies, democracy is observed as having a pacifying effect upon the escalation of hostilities 
between states.  
Secondly, the issue at stake between parties is the other important factor for 
escalation of hostilities in a conflict.  The earliest studies show that if the issue is territorial 
integrity and regime stability, parties in a conflict are more likely to escalate to war 
(Gochman and Leng, 1983; Leng and Singer, 1988; Vasquez and Henehan, 2001).  
However, some other studies demonstrate that the mere territorial integrity does not lead to 
escalation, but with other conditions it does.  Senese (1996) shows that contiguity and the 
presence of territorial dissonances do not increase the observed levels of hostility; however, 
if force is used in territorial conflicts, higher levels of fatalities occur.  Rather than 
escalating to war, territorial issues give any parties more incentive to reciprocate dispute 
actions (Hensel, 1996).  Moreover, Ghosn et al. (2004) find that territorial conflicts are more 
likely to cause greater fatalities than is the case when territorial integrity is not at stake.  
Other than joint democracy, the second most important issue for escalation seems to be 
territorial integrity.  We can say that territorial issues might be a case of “war due to issue 
indivisibilities,” as Fearon (1995) indicates. As a result, territorial conflicts are very difficult 
to resolve in peaceful and bargaining manner.   
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Thirdly, under the tenets of power transition theory, a number of studies argue that 
satisfaction with the status quo affects the onset and escalation phases of conflicts (Organski 
and Kugler, 1980; Lemke and Reed, 1996; Lemke, 2002).  Others similarly argued that the 
level of dissimilarity in foreign policy preferences among two states may increase the 
chances of conflict between them (Gartzke, 2001).  Consequently, if both states are satisfied 
with current international order, then they have less incentive to fight one another. 
Fourthly, researchers have also argued the relationship between power 
preponderance and conflict processes.  However, these theoretical and empirical arguments 
are discrepant; for instance, Waltz (1979) claimed that power preponderance increases the 
likelihood of war, whilst some others have countered this claim and said that power 
preponderance decreases  the  probability of both conflict (Kugler and Lemke, 1996) and 
escalation to war (Moul, 1988).  
Lastly, a series of studies have attempted to explain the effect of joint alliance 
membership on the probability of conflict and escalation processes (Bueno de Mesquita, 
1981; Bremer, 1992).  Like the claims on power preponderance, the results on the impact of 
joint alliance membership are mingled.  However, in multivariate models of escalation joint 
alliance appears to reduce the probability of war between allies if both are not more 
militarized (Bremer, 1992; look at also Siverson and Starr (1990) for an alternative 
explanation and bivariate model).   
To sum, according to literature, five variables such as, joint democracy, territorial 
disagreement, status quo satisfaction, power preponderance, and joint alliance membership 
are expected to correlate with escalation processes.  However, joint democracy and 
territorial controversy seem to have consistent impact on escalation probability implying 
that these factors frame a general character for the escalation process. 
 
2.3. What is missing in the Literature? 
As indicated in the Introduction, the previous studies tend to assume that incidents in a 
dispute follow a regular path where use of force is preceded by lower levels of hostile action 
such as threat or display of force, and treat a dispute as having escalated if force was used.  
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Nevertheless, thanks to MID-IP dataset, considerable number of inaccuracies is observed in 
the real world which can shake the assumption by its roots.  The MID-IP dataset indicates 
that states directly utilize force (i.e. without a preceding threat or display of force) in a 
significant number of disputes. Those about more than 40% disputes between 1993 and 
2001 directly start with use of force as a beginning hostility level (at the MID Onset level).  
Very few studies have made warnings regarding this possibility of direct use of force.  
Firstly Dixon (1993) indicated this probability of direct use of force by saying that:  
In his presidential speech to the Peace Science Society, Diehl (2006) articulates the same 
possibility:  
“… I draw (the framework)  from  Bloomfield  and  Leiss  (1969) by  
assuming that conflicts  are dynamic  situations  that  evolve  over time  
(see  also  Alker  and  Sherman,  1982;  Sherman, 1993).  This 
evolutionary process should not be thought of as continuous movement 
along some single or fixed trajectory.  Most  conflict  situations consist  
of relatively  static periods  of contention  punctuated  by  sporadic  
transitions  marking  discernible shifts  in  levels  of  antagonism  and  
severity.  In  the international  arena,  we  usually  characterize  the  
severity  of conflicts  with  reference  to disputant  parties' reliance  on  
military  force  (Bloomfield and Leiss, 1969; Gochman and Maoz, 
1984).  This process need not follow a preordained series of steps or 
threshold levels.  To be  sure,  some  interstate  grievances  emerge with  
such  severity  that military hostilities  are initiated almost  immediately,  
but  this  is  relatively  rare.” (emphasis mine) 
“[Escalation] begins when two or more actors have already passed the 
initiation stage and now are at risk of escalating their conflict to war. 
Research in this phase typically analyzes all crises or disputes to 
determine which go to war and under what conditions. Some analyses 
look more broadly at all possible combinations of states or only 
politically relevant dyads and thereby ignore the initiation phase 
altogether… In any event, studies in this phase typically use war/no war 
as the dependent variable. Many of the most prominent works in 
international conflict research concentrate on this phase (e.g., Vasquez, 
1993; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981).” (emphasis mine) 
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What Diehl means by the initiation phase is the first phase of conflict in which two 
or more states enter a conflictual relationship. This relationship occurs after a contingent 
level of violence is passed somehow during a crisis. However, operationalization of this 
threshold might be quite difficult in terms of standardizing the disagreement levels between 
parties, thereby determining the initiation point might be discretionary. Therefore, many of 
the studies on interstate typically assume that conflict initiation occurs when threat or 
display of force is observed by one side (Ghosn et al., 2004).  
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND DESCRIPTION OF DIRECT ESCALATION 
 
3.1. Data 
Most of the interstate conflict studies have used MID datasets for their research on 
escalation processes.  Therefore, empirical research tends to be somehow standardized in 
terms of dataset employment.  For my empirical analyses of direct escalations, I also use 
Dyadic Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID version 3) dataset and MID Incident Level 
dataset (MID-IP), to indicate escalation factors and to identify cases of direct escalations 
respectively.   
Before delving into detailed description direct escalations, distinguishing between 
terms of dispute and incident would be very useful.  A “militarized incident is defined as a 
single military action involving an explicit threat, display, or use of force by one system 
member state towards another system member state” (Jones et al., 1996, p.169).  So, 
incidents are the militarized actions occurring between states and they constitute interstate 
dispute: “Militarized incidents provide the building blocks from which each MID is 
constructed” (Jones et al., 1996, p.169).  Each MID includes at least one incident so that a 
typical dispute can consists of more than one incident.  What define incidents are the actions 
undertaken by interstate members. Four main categories of these actions are; threats of 
force, displays of force, uses of force, interstate war.  Each incident consists of only one type 
of actions and if an event consists of two or more types of actions, each is coded as a 
separate incident (Ghosn et al., 2004). 
As indicated before, we call cases in which the first action of a dispute has hostility 
level of use of force or more “direct escalations.”  At the first stage of my empirical work, I 
use MID-IP dataset.  Identifying cases of direct escalation is very simple in MID-IP dataset 
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because it has standardized coding scheme across cases and enables to observe every single 
incident in a MID.  Among the cases of direct escalation, no interstate war is observed 
between the dyads at the onset; thus, all of the cases begin with uses of force in terms of 
hostility level.  When we look at actions classified as use of force, clash2, attack3, and 
seizure4 are the most common actions at the onset with percentages of 31, 29, and 26 
respectively. 
After completing identification of direct escalations by using the MID-IP dateset, I 
incorporate them into comprehensive dataset of non-directed dyads for the years 1993-2001.  
For further analysis, I employ this dyadic MID dataset.  The number of observations in the 
dataset is 158405, among which 622 bilateral MIDs took place.  However, we need to be 
aware of that if MID protracts more than a year, then occurrence of MID is also coded for 
each extra year.  For example, the MID between the US and North Korea (with a MID 
Number of 4087) lasts for six years which means six of 622 bilateral MIDs are between the 
US and North Korea.  What we concern while coding direct escalation is the onset of MIDs; 
in other words, the year that a dispute began (the first year)5. Of the full set of 622 MIDs 
(1993-2001), 352 (57% of the total) are MID onsets, and 137 (22% of the total and 39% of 
the MID onsets) are direct escalations.  In the remaining part of this section, I will discuss 
the descriptive statistics of these 137 direct escalation cases.  Table 1 in the Appendix part 
shows the descriptive variables of each dyadic directly escalated observation.  The coding 
scheme of this table is very consistent with Jones et al. (1996) and Ghosn et al. (2004). 
While doing this discussion, I will also refer to the literature for the descriptive and 
explanatory variables I use throughout the thesis. 
 
                                               
2“Outbreak of military hostilities between regular armed forces of two or more system members, in which the 
initiator may or may not be clearly identified” (Jones et al., 1996, p.173). 
3 “Use of regular armed forces of a state to fire upon the armed forces, population, or territory of another state. 
Within this incident type, the initiator can be clearly identified and its action is not sanctioned by the target” 
(Jones et al., 1996, p.173). 
4 “Capture of material or personnel of official forces from another state, or the detention of private citizens 
operating within contested territory. Seizures must last at least twenty-four hours to be included” (Jones et al., 
1996, p.173). 
5 Data for MID onsets are described by Ghosn et al. (2004).  
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3.2. Description of Direct Escalation 
Empirical findings have consistently showed that presence of major power in a dispute 
characterizes dyads as more dangerous and war-prone (Bremer, 1992; Moul, 2003).  For this 
study, I employ Small and Singer’s (1982) operationalization for identifying Major Powers.  
The states that are not included in this list are coded as minor powers6.  According to the 
literature, dyads consisting exclusive of minor powers are expected to have less probability 
to escalate MIDs (Bremer, 1992).  Interestingly though, of the total 137 direct escalation 
cases in my dataset, 103 take places between minor powers and only seven occurs between 
major powers. This result might imply that major powers are much more cautious of directly 
employing force in international crises with each other, perhaps due mainly to much higher 
expected costs for both sides. Yet, minor pairs do not seem to behave in a prudent manner 
and more frequently engage in a direct use of force at the onset level. 
To explain the patterns of escalation through variations in regime types has been 
another popular scholarly trend in international conflict literature.  Numerous studies have 
shown sharing democratic norms and institutions among members of the dyad significantly 
reduced war-proneness as well (Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Bremer, 1992), different 
escalation definitions (Maoz and Russett, 1993; Hart and Reed, 1999), and different levels 
of conflict (Senese, 1997).  For my thesis, I use Jagger and Gurr’s (1995) Polity IV dataset, 
which comprises the Polity score of countries’ democracy levels in order to generate “Joint 
Democracy” variable. The Polity score is an aggregate index that scores a country’s political 
institutions on several dimensions with higher scores corresponding to more democratic 
structures. The final score ranges from -10 (totally autocratic) to 10 (full democratic).  From 
the Polity score, I create a dichotomous variable that equals to one if both members of a 
dyad have democracy scores of six or greater. Although there is broad agreement that joint 
democracy is expected to affect MID Onset negatively, its effect on escalation is more 
controversial (Reed, 2000).  Simplistic expectation from impact of joint democracy on 
escalation is that it would decrease the probability of escalation because democracies are 
conceived as centers of nonviolent dispute resolution (Dixon, 1994), and communicate their 
level of resolve more credibly at the outset of a crisis (Partell and Palmer, 1997).  However, 
                                               
6 Major powers are the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, France, the U.K., Germany, and Japan. 
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efforts to find nonviolent dispute resolution may be a strong pacifying effect on MID Onset 
stage.  However, democratic dyads can make escalation among the two more likely if a 
crisis succeeds to materialize despite such pacifying effects.  Reed (2000) empirically shows 
by using censored probit estimation that although joint democracy and joint satisfaction with 
the status quo are found to have robust pacifying effects on the onset of conflict, the results 
suggest that they are unrelated to the escalation of disputes to war.  If that is the case, our 
expectation might be that joint democracy has negative influence on MID Onset and on 
direct escalations however it has positive influence on escalation.  Nevertheless, Kinsella 
and Russett (2002) suggest that joint democracy might have no relationship with escalation 
due to controlling for its prior impact on MID Onset.   
Statistics show that democratic peace might have an impact on direct escalations.  
Out of 137 direct escalations, only 35 cases (26% of the total) are between joint 
democracies.  These descriptive statistics tentatively suggest that when a democracy has a 
conflict with another democracy, it might behave much more prudently or peacefully.  
Contiguity is another factor often used to explain the onset of interstate war (Bremer, 
1992).  I use Stinnett et al.’s (2002) contiguity definition to generate a dummy variable 
which is equal  to one if the dyad members  share a land border  or  separated  by  fewer  
than  125km  of  water.  According to this definition, contiguity seems to have also a major 
impact on direct escalations.  81 percent of the direct escalations (111 cases out of 137) take 
place between contiguous states. Hypothetically, it is very likely that contiguous states 
might direct use of force one another because as distance between two states increases, the 
projection of the military power decreases7.   
Although joint alliance has mixed effect on the likelihood of conflict and escalation 
process in some studies (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981), in multivariate models of escalation it 
appears to reduce the probability of war between allies if both are not more militarized 
(Bremer, 1992).  For my research, I use Gibler and Sarkees’s (2004) defense pacts data in 
order to see the effect of alliance on direct escalations.  Defense pacts indicate whether 
                                               
7 Some of the recent studies find that rather than a pure distance between conflicting parties, the quality of 
contiguity is also important.  As Braithwaite (2006) shows, type of terrains between countries in terms of how 
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parties of the dyad both join in a treaty of alliance providing security guarantees of mutual 
assistance in the incidence either party is attacked.  This type of alliance is the highest 
degree of common security interests which is very powerful to make parties avoid MID and 
escalation. When we look at alliance types of the states involving direct escalation, 62 
percent of the total (77 cases out of 137) has no agreement before a conflict began.  
However, 38 cases interestingly share at least one defense pact at the outset of the conflict 
(30% of the total). Although this amount is not as large as the number of having no 
agreement, it is still considerable because defense pact shows the highest degree of common 
security interests, and is very effective to make allied states avoid MID and escalation.  
To identify the issues at stake for direct escalations I look at revision types of both 
parties. In MID dataset, the main issues for both sided underlying each incident are 
identified very clearly under the name of “revisionist type” (Ghosn et al., 2004).  When we 
look at the results, approximately 28% of the total cases do not have a specific type of an 
issue. The most common issue type is territorial ones.  Territorial issues are “situations 
where the actors are attempting to gain control over a piece of territory that they claim but 
do not possess.”  A number of scholars identify territorial integrity and regime stability as 
vital issues which more probably lead to conflict and escalation to war (Gochman and Leng, 
1983; Leng and Singer, 1988).  Almost 31 percent of the direct escalations occur due to 
territorial conflicts which are also aligned with the literature.  Therefore, territorial issues are 
one of the most important indicators of conflict escalation.  The second most common type 
relates to issues on policy imposition (25% of the total).  Policy issues are “cases when the 
actor seeks to change the policy behavior of the target8.”  Surprisingly, the cases based on 
regime issues which the desire of the actor is to change the government of the target are very 
few compared to the other types.  Only 5 percent of the total directly escalated conflicts are 
originated from regime issues. 
In order to analyze escalation trends of the disputes beginning with direct 
escalations, I compare the first and the highest actions in the disputes.  Only 11 of 137 cases 
                                                                                                                                                
easily borders can be passed and whether borders include vital places in terms of resources and strategy also 
influence conflict behavior of the states.  For this study, however, I do not address this debate. 
8 We can learn roles of the states (e.g. which state is an initiator or a target) from Table 1 by looking at Role A 
column for Country 1 and Role B column for Country 2. 
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end with a higher level of action compared to the MID onset among which only one dispute 
escalates to war. However, in 72 cases (53% of the total) target states do not even 
reciprocates.  Therefore, concluding that direct escalations end with worse consequences 
(e.g. war) might not be true based on these results. 
Lastly, I look at overall dispute outcome and MID settlement of the directly 
escalated cases.  Of the total 137 directly escalated disputes, outcome of 90 cases (66%) is 
stalemate9, and only that of 9 cases end with a victory10 for side A.  Moreover, 71 percent of 
these disputes do not culminate with any type of settlement meaning that “none of the pre-
conditions that fueled the conflict are resolved nor is there any agreement between the 
parties that the dispute should be terminated.  No settlement is identified when none of the 
conditions of negotiated settlement are present; there is no evidence of any attempt to 
impose a resolution of the conflict, and no evidence of any unconditional surrender. 
Basically no settlement denotes the lack of any formal or informal effort which successfully 
resolves or terminates a dispute (Jones et al., 1996).”  As a consequence, using force at the 
very beginning of a conflict does not increase the chance of having victory over a target 
state through taking the advantage of imposing high cost at the beginning and causing 
fearful circumstances for the target state, as well as not lead to resolution of a problem as 
quickly as possible between both sides. On the contrary, this kind of attempt in the first 
incident seems to cause protraction of a conflict.   
 
 
 
                                               
9 “A stalemate is defined by the lack of any decisive changes in the pre-dispute status quo and is identified 
when the outcome does not favor either side in the dispute.  Stalemates usually are produced when there was 
no alteration of the status quo.  However, they can occur even if the status quo has changed so long as net 
balance results in a draw” (Jones et al., 1996, p.180). 
10 “A victory is defined by the favorable alteration of the status quo by one state through the use of militarized 
action which imposes defeat upon the opponent.  It denotes the attainment of a tangible piece of territory, the 
significant change in an adversary's foreign policy, or the successful down-fall of another state's political 
regime by force.  A victory can be identified whenever one or more state(s) are able to secure a favorable 
change through the application of successful military actions which directly leads to a forced alteration of the 
pre-dispute status quo” (Jones et al., 1996, p.180). 
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CHAPTER 4 
DETERMINANTS OF DIRECT ESCALATION 
 
To see how the variables that we have discussed are significant to explain whether an 
incident occurs as direct escalation, and to what extent my classification of MIDs (MIDs 
with/without direct escalation) is reliable, I run an ordered probit estimation.  My dependent 
variable, “Ordered MID Level,” is equal to zero if no MID occurs, equal to 1 if MID occurs 
without direct escalation, and equal to 2 if we observe direct escalation in a MID.  This kind 
of an order assumes that as Ordered MID Level increases severity of a MID increaases in 
terms of the first incident.  In addition to aforementioned predictors of direct escalation in 
chapter 3, I add some other explanatory variables such as, joint satisfaction, power 
preponderance, total GDP per capita of the dyads, and peace years of the dyads until a new 
dispute begins.  The way of operationalization of these variables is as follows11: 
Power status of the combatants: “Minor-Minor” status  which is  equal  to  1  when  
both  dyad  members  are Minor  Powers based on Small  and  Singer’s (1982) list 
indicating Major Powers.  The states that are not included in this list are coded as 
minor powers.  According to the literature, minor pairs are expected to have less 
probability to escalate MIDs (Bremer, 1992). 
Regime type: “Joint Democracy” variable based on Jagger and Gurr’s (1995) Polity 
IV dataset which comprises scaled information of countries’ democracy levels.  This 
variable is a dichotomous variable equal to one if both dyad members have 
democracy scores of six or greater.  Simplistic expectation from impact of joint 
                                               
11 Names and ways of operationalization of these variables are the same as what Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) 
do in their study.  I intentionally choose this way for the sake of consistency and easy comparison of the results 
in the replication section. 
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democracy on interstate conflict is that it would play a pacifying role because 
democracies are conceived as centers of nonviolent dispute resolution. 
Power Parity: When we look at power parities between the dyads, power 
preponderance is more contributory to peace in a dyad than power parity (Moul, 
1988; Bremer, 1992; Kugler and Lemke, 1996).  However, its impact is not as 
considerable as that of others.  To generate “Power Preponderance” we use COW’s 
Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score which was first described by 
Singer et al. (1972).  We calculate the share of dyadic capabilities possessed by the 
stronger member of the dyad.  Thus, 0.5 indicates that perfect equality within the 
dyad whereas 1 indicates that the stronger state preponderates its power.   
Degree of Support on the Existing Status Quo: “Joint Satisfaction” is our other 
independent variable referring to satisfaction of the dyads from international system.  
It is a dichotomous variable equal to one if both parties in dyads have positive tau-b 
alliance portfolio similarity scores with the international system’s hegemonic state.  
For example, according to tau-b scores, these states are the UK for the period 1919-
1945 and the US for the period 1946 onwards.  Based on Organski and Kugler’s 
argument on power transition, the expectation is that when both parties in dyads are 
jointly satisfied with the international system, they might have a kind of inherent 
resemblance so that they can avoid having conflict with each other and find some 
kind of easier solutions for their problems compared to parties that are not jointly 
satisfied. 
Alliance: According to Bremer (1992), having treaties is also the factor to reduce the 
probability of war between allies if both are not more militarized.  In order to see the 
effect of alliance we use Gibler and Sarkees’s (2004) defense pacts data.  “Allied” is 
a dichotomous variable equal to one if the MID occurs between the states having a 
defense pact with one another.  Defense pacts indicate whether parties of the dyad 
both join in a treaty of alliance providing security guarantees of mutual assistance in 
the incidence either party is attacked.  This type of alliance is the highest degree of 
common security interests which is very powerful to make parties avoid MID and 
escalation. 
Geographical position: We use Stinnett et al.’s (2002) “Contiguity” definition to 
generate a dummy variable which is equal to one  if  the  dyad  members  are  
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directly contiguous  or  separated  by  fewer  than  125km  of  water.  We expect a 
positive impact from contiguity on both MID onset and direct escalation incentive. 
The issue type at stake:  Territorial issues are one of the most important inducing 
predictors of conflict escalation.  We generate the variable of “Territory” from MID 
dataset.  It is again a dichotomous variable equal to one if the MID occurs due to 
joint disagreement about territory.  Territorial issues can be classified as an “issue of 
indivisibilities” (Fearon, 1995).  So, positive relationship between territorial dispute 
and conflict might be expected. 
Economic development level of the dyads:  Economic development can be a sign 
of the level of news availability in sources or in databases due maybe to its impact on 
communication and media advancement, data collection quality, or increasing the 
focus of database compliers. Therefore, as economic development increases all these 
attributes are positively affected which may turn into fewer observations of direct 
escalation, and being more informed about lower levels of a dispute.  I use total GDP 
per capita of the dyads as a proxy variable based on Gleditsch Expanded Trade 
dataset (v 4.1).  For the sake of convenient representation of results, I divide the 
variable by 1000.  Moreover, because Gleditsch’s dataset is not available for the year 
of 2001, I run the regression without the observations taking place in 2001. My 
expectation is negative relationship between economic conditions and conflict. 
Duration dependence: Lastly, to  control  for  duration  dependence,  we  have  
included Carter  and  Signorino’s (2010)  cubic  polynomial  specification  of  “Peace 
Years.” 
 
4.1. Analysis of the Results 
Table 2 shows the estimation results of the ordered probit regression. Recall that the 
observations taking place in 2001 are excluded due to data availability in Gleditsch’s 
dataset; thus, total number of observations drops to 137455.  
First of all, the threshold parameters (Cut1 and Cut2) appear to be statistically 
significantly different from each other, justifying my three-part categorization.  The model 
demonstrates that latent ordered MID level variable is increasing in contiguity, territorial 
controversy, and interestingly, having an alliance.  For instance, if a dispute is motivated by 
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territorial controversy, his ordered probit-odds of being in a direct escalation category would 
increase by 2.1 times while the other variables in the model are held constant at their mean. 
The relevant regressors are highly statistically significant. Although we expect this 
relationship from the variables of contiguity and territorial issues, observing a similar 
relationship from alliance is quite interesting.  Hypothetically, when both parties in dyads 
have defense pact with one another, they might have less probability of having high degree 
MIDs because defense pact shows the highest degree of common security interests, and is 
very effective to make allied states avoid MID and escalation.   Maybe, more conflict-prone 
dyads might have much tendency to establish stronger alliances in order to decrease the 
likelihood of having severe conflicts in the future which might be insufficient due to their 
inherent hostile backgrounds and attitudes to each other.   
On the contrary, joint democracy, joint satisfaction, power preponderance, being 
minor pairs, economic conditions of dyads, and duration of peace have negative relationship 
with our dependent variable meaning that they decrease the probability of observing higher 
levels of MID, and so direct escalation, as I expected.  However, only joint satisfaction is 
statistically insignificant.  Theoretically, if states are jointly satisfied with the international 
system, they might have a kind of inherent resemblance so that they can avoid having 
conflict with each other and find some kind of easier solutions for their problems compared 
to parties that are not jointly satisfied. The possible reason of this insignificance might be 
due to the fact that rather than classifying states according to level of their tau-b scores, I 
only consider whether dyads have positive tau-b alliance portfolio similarity scores with the 
international system’s hegemonic state; thus, the variable might lose its sensitivity to explain 
the variation in the dependent variable.   
Lastly the negative and significant relationship between economic conditions of a 
dyad and the probability of direct escalation is worth noting.  As indicated before, this 
variance might stem from data availability and/or differences in data quality.  Our result 
might suggest that empirical patterns are not consistent across the world and that less-
developed countries are disproportionally likely to be neglected from standard data-based 
research (Lemke, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 5 
HOW DIRECT ESCALATIONS AFFECT REGRESSION MODELS: A 
REPLICATION OF BRAITHWAITE AND LEMKE (2011)  
 
In this section I replicate the model proposed by Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) with a non-
directed dyadic MID dataset (1993-2001)12.  My intent is to see whether the results remain 
robust when the directly escalated dispute onsets are excluded from the dataset.  I have one 
theoretical and one statistical justification for this scholarly endeavor.  The theoretical one is 
that direct escalations, by definition, are the cases not conforming to the assumptions of 
escalation dynamics. They have different dynamics and predictors, so that we should 
consider these cases differently than other MIDs. Therefore, omitting them from estimations 
might change the results observed in the previous research.  The statistical justification is 
that if the direct escalations have the same escalation dynamics with other MIDs, then the 
omission of these cases would be missing at random; thus, replication results would remain 
the same. To see which justification matters for direct escalations, we do replicate 
Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) which is the most recent study examining escalation 
dynamics.  Before going into the replication, I should briefly summarize what Braithwaite 
and Lemke do in their study. 
 The main argument of Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) is to examine escalation 
simultaneously with its six different measures proposed by the previous studies, and to 
observe whether variety of these measures lead to generalizable estimation results.  They 
demonstrate few robust relationships across different measures of escalation.  Braithwaite 
and Lemke (2011) indicate that escalation is generally modeled as non-controversial 
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phenomenon which in fact causes variations in empirical results verifying the theoretical 
argument.  According to them, careful description of escalatory behavior is quite important 
to understand escalation.  However, despite a broad analysis of escalatory patterns, this 
study also overlooks direct escalations in their description of escalatory behavior. 
 To explain several phenomena, conflict escalation studies have used variety of 
measures: the highest action of a dispute on the MID hostility scale (Maoz and Russett, 
1993; Hart and Reed, 1999); mutual use of force of two sides or being involved in a COW 
war (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Schultz, 2001); occurrence of a reciprocation of 
the target side (Prins and Sprecher, 1999; Schultz, 2001); considerable levels of battle 
fatalities (Palmer et al., 2004).  Based on these studies, Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) 
compile six different measures of escalation13.  The first escalation measure (Reciprocated) 
is based on whether the target state reciprocates the initiator’s action.  The second measure 
(Use of Force) is whether a use of force took place during a dispute.  Their  third  measure 
of  escalation is a “Mutual  Use  of  Force”  taking  a  value  of  one  if  both  parties used  
force  during  the  dispute.  Our final three measures of escalation are based on different 
levels of fatalities in MIDs.  “Fatalities > 0” takes a value of one in disputes where at least 
one combatant died.  “Fatalities > 250”  indicates more substantial  loss-of-life  situations  
and  takes  a  value  of  only  if  at  least 250  soldiers died  during  the  MID.   And finally, 
fatalities more than 1000 indicate battle  fatality  threshold  specifying  the  dispute  as  an  
interstate  war.   The last measure is the most used measure of escalation in the past 
empirical studies (Wallace, 1979; Diehl, 1983; Senese and Vasquez, 2008). The very 
innovation of Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) is the examination of all six measures of 
escalation at the same time.   
However, in order to estimate the impact of independent variables on escalation 
process, we need to understand their impact on the onset of the disputes in the first place.  
The previous studies concerned very little with the problems related to selection-bias 
(Braithwaite and Lemke, 2011).  Since combatants select themselves into conflict, these 
dyads involved in the escalation stages do not constitute a random sample which, in fact, 
                                                                                                                                                
12 Note that Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) also use the same data set but the previous version of it.  Moreover, 
they have much more observations, around 500000; due to the larger time span (1815-1995) than we have. 
13 I also use these measures without any change or exception. 
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leads to selection bias in a sample.  Statistical analysis of escalation without paying attention 
to the prior phase of conflict, such as onset, probably yields biased results (Reed, 2000).   
To address the potential for selection bias in such cases, Reed (2000) and Lemke and 
Reed (2001) employed Heckman-Two Step models. This model unites the phases of conflict 
in a single estimator. They treat the first phase or stage of their model as dyadic involvement 
in a dispute.  The second stage is treated as the escalation to war.  Reed (2000) shows that 
although joint democracy and joint satisfaction with the status quo are found to have robust 
pacifying effects on the onset of conflict, the results suggest that they are unrelated to the 
escalation of disputes to war which strengthens the suspicions on selection-bias. 
For the replication, the dependent variable of the first stage is MID Onset.  For each 
of the nearly 159000 observations this variable equals one only in dyad years in which a 
dispute began.  Data for MID onsets are described by Ghosn et al. (2004). The second 
dependent variable, Escalation, is recorded for those 344 observations in which a MID 
occurred. After the omission of direct escalations this value drops to 215.  Dyad years 
without MIDs are censored and excluded from calculation of the independent variables’ 
influences on escalation. Information on escalation is described in Ghosn et al. (2004).  
For the most part, I employ the same explanatory variables with Braithwaite and 
Lemke (2011).  To explain Escalation, I use Joint Democracy, Joint Satisfaction, Power 
Preponderance, and Allied.  Yet, Heckman (1979) indicates that adding more predictors in 
analysis of the first stage (MID Onset) is statistical necessity.  If these extra predictors in the 
first stage are strongly correlated with MID Onset and uncorrelated with escalation, then we 
can make healthier inferences.  Therefore, I add Contiguity, Minor-Minor status, and cubic 
polynomial specification of Peace Years as extra predictors of MID Onset14. 
 
                                               
14 Unlike Braithwaite and Lemke (2011), I could not add the independent variables of Territorial Claim and 
Rivalry to the first stage estimation.  The reason for not including Territorial Claim is that this dataset is only 
available for the period 1919-1995 (Huth and Allee, 2002); thus, it does not conform to our time period 1993-
2001 as whole.  The same problem exists in Rivalry data (Thompson, 2001).  Although Klein, Goertz, and 
Diehl (2006) compile new data covering the years until 2002, I do not integrate their data because their way of 
operationalization of rival states is different. 
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5.1. Analysis of the Results 
Tables 3-8 show the estimation results for six different escalation measures.  Each table 
consists of estimates both with and without direct escalations cases.  Except for the 
estimates in the table of War, the results are calculated properly to be able to make 
inferences15.   
 At the first view, most of the independent variables have similar impacts and 
significance levels as Braithwaite and Lemke (2011) found.  In the first state estimation, 
contiguity, minor-minor status, joint democracy, power preponderance, and peace years 
have all expected impacts on MID Onset in both my study and Braithwaite and Lemke’s 
study.  While contiguity increases the probability of having MID Onset, being minor or 
jointly democratic pairs, having power preponderance over the other side, and peaceful past 
decrease this probability.  For the second stage, both studies do not have consistently 
significant estimates, except joint democracy in my estimation.  Moreover, both studies have 
statistically significant and negative selection parameter, rho, showing that unobservable 
factors of both stages are negatively correlated with one another and analysis of escalation 
cannot be separated from analysis of conflict onset.  This situation also suggests that 
employing such estimators is appropriate in the analysis of escalation. 
 When we look one of the most important predictors of escalation processes, joint 
democracy has negative and significant impact on the dependent variables at both stages.  
Therefore, the straightforward Democratic Peace expectation that joint democracy will make 
both onset and escalation less likely is confirmed at my empirical analysis.  I think the 
Democratic Peace seems to tell a more convincing story about conflict onset than it does 
about escalation because at the onset level it is always significant across different escalation 
measures.  
However, when we compare the estimation results of with and without direct 
escalations, decreases in both value and significance of joint democracy in the first stage 
estimation after the omission of direct escalations draws our attention.  On the contrary, in 
                                               
15 Improper results in the table of war are quite normal because the employed escalation measure here is 
restrictive and leads to produce fewer escalation cases. 
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the second stage estimation we observe increases in both value and significance level of 
joint democracy after the omission of direct escalations.  Especially, the escalation-pacifying  
effect  of joint  democracy  on  mutual  use  of  force (the second stage)  seems  reasonably  
more effective and significant after we exclude direct escalations which is inconsistent with 
Senese (1997).  Such a result is quite interesting because of the total omission of 137 cases, 
only 25 are joint democracies.  This kind of observation in joint democracy is quite 
important to make inferences about direct escalations, their dynamics, and status compared 
to other MID escalations because joint democracy is a cornerstone predictor identifying 
escalation dynamics.  If the role of this predictor changes somehow with respect to the 
situation of direct escalations, then we might say that, (1) direct escalations might not have 
the same dynamics with the other MID escalations implying that they might be conceptually 
different, (2) we might not comfortably assume that all MIDs have the similar escalatory 
patterns, and (3) the omission of the direct escalations may not be missing at random. 
The results associated with joint democracy appeared in the second stage estimation 
of different escalation measures (increase in both absolute value of the coefficients and 
significance level) also suggest that if democratic dyads try to communicate before 
involving direct use of force, they might find peaceful resolutions for their problems even at 
the escalation level. These findings fall well in line with arguments highlighting normative 
advantages democratic dyads employ in resolving conflicts that have already arisen – if one 
gives peace a chance, democratic dyads are more likely to dissolve a conflict before it 
escalates (Maoz and Russett, 1993). 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis attempted to propose two important contributions to the literature: 
1) Direct escalations might conceptually diverge from other MID escalations, and they 
might have different dynamics. My replication showed that, without direct escalations, a 
canonical model on escalation gives varying estimates for joint democracy estimate which 
has been the most consistent variable across many international conflict studies in terms of 
being escalation pacifier.  Claiming that all MIDs have the similar escalatory patterns is 
quite hard after these results, implying that the omission of the direct escalations might not 
be missing at random.  Additionally, statistically significant threshold parameters (Cut1 and 
Cut2) in ordered probit model demonstrates that MID without direct escalation and MID 
with direct escalation categories should not be collapsed into one category. 
2) The onset of direct escalations can be predicted by conventional explanatory variables 
used in conflict studies. Contiguity, territorial issues (as promoters), being jointly 
democratic, power status, power preponderance of one party, and having peaceful past (as 
pacifiers) are the most significant and effective predictors of the onset of direct escalations.  
Although joint satisfaction has a pacifier impact on direct escalations, it is not as significant 
as the others.  Additionally, observing many cases of direct escalation may be due to the fact 
that members in a dyad are not well-developed in communication and media, and data 
collection, or they do not have enough priority in the eyes of database compliers because of 
their economic backwardness.   
Finally, we might suggest that if democratic dyads sit and talk before involving 
direct use of force at the very beginning of a dispute, they might find peaceful resolutions 
for their problems even at the escalation level.  Perhaps development along this thesis could 
27 
 
explain why direct escalations are different than other MIDs, what predict these cases, and 
to what extent Democratic Peace seems tell a more convincing story about conflict onset or 
about escalation. 
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Disputes Starting with Direct Use of Force (Direct Escalations)
(Dyadic Interstate Conflicts)
Year Country A Country B JointDemoc. Contig. Allied FirstAct High.Act.A High.Act.B Rev.TypeA Rev.TypeB Outcome Settle RoleA RoleB
1997 USA CAN 1 1 1 15 0 15 0 2 7 2 3 1
1996 USA CUB 0 1 4 16 0 16 0 2 5 3 3 1
1993 USA HAI 0 0 1 13 13 7 3 2 1 2 1 3
1997 USA RUS 0 1 4 15 15 0 2 0 5 3 1 3
2000 USA RUS 1 1 4 15 15 0 2 0 7 2 1 3
1998 USA SUD 0 0 4 16 16 0 2 0 5 3 1 3
1993 USA IRQ 0 0 4 16 16 0 4 0 5 3 1 3
1994 USA IRQ 0 0 4 15 15 0 2 0 7 2 1 3
1998 USA AFG 0 0 4 16 16 0 4 0 5 3 1 3
1993 CAN HAI 0 0 1 13 13 0 3 0 1 2 1 3
1993 HAI ARG 0 0 1 13 0 13 0 3 1 2 3 1
1993 HAI UKG 0 0 4 13 0 13 0 3 1 2 3 2
1993 HAI NTH 0 0 4 13 0 13 0 3 1 2 3 2
1993 HAI FRN 0 0 4 13 0 13 0 3 1 2 3 1
1996 TRI VEN 1 1 1 16 0 16 0 2 5 3 3 1
1997 TRI VEN 1 1 1 15 0 16 0 2 5 3 3 1
1999 TRI VEN 1 1 1 15 0 15 0 2 5 3 3 1
2000 BLZ GUA 1 1 1 15 7 15 1 1 5 3 3 1
1995 HON NIC 1 1 1 15 17 17 2 2 5 4 3 1
1997 HON NIC 1 1 1 15 15 16 2 2 5 3 3 1
2000 HON NIC 1 1 1 17 17 17 2 2 6 1 1 3
1997 SAL NIC 1 1 1 15 15 0 2 0 8 3 1 3
1994 NIC COL 1 1 1 15 15 0 2 0 8 3 1 3
2001 NIC COL 1 1 15 0 15 0 2 7 1 3 1
1994 COL VEN 1 1 1 15 0 15 0 1 7 3 3 1
1997 COL VEN 1 1 1 16 0 16 0 4 6 1 3 1
2000 COL VEN 1 1 1 16 0 16 0 4 5 3 3 1
Continued on the next page
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Table 1 – continued from the previous page
Year Country A Country B Joint Dem. Contig. Allied FirstAct High.Act.A High.Act.B Rev.TypeA Rev.TypeB Outcome Settle RoleA RoleB
1995 ECU PER 0 1 1 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
1996 ECU PER 0 1 1 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 3 1
1998 ECU PER 0 1 1 14 14 11 1 1 6 1 1 3
1996 CHL UKG 1 0 4 15 0 15 0 2 7 4 3 1
2000 UKG YUG 1 0 4 15 0 15 0 2 7 3 3 1
1997 POL RUS 0 1 4 15 0 15 0 4 7 1 3 1
1993 ALB MAC 1 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
1997 ALB MAC 1 1 4 17 17 17 2 2 5 3 1 3
1994 ALB GRC 1 1 4 16 17 17 2 1 5 3 3 1
1997 ALB GRC 1 1 4 16 0 16 0 4 6 1 3 1
2000 CRO YUG 1 1 4 15 7 15 3 1 5 3 3 1
1993 CRO BOS 0 1 1 17 17 17 1 1 6 1 1 3
1994 CRO BOS 0 1 1 17 17 17 1 1 6 1 1 3
1996 CRO BOS 0 1 1 15 15 0 2 0 7 2 1 3
1993 CYP TUR 1 1 4 16 16 0 1 0 5 3 1 3
1996 CYP TUR 1 1 4 16 16 16 1 1 5 3 3 1
1996 BUL KZK 0 0 4 15 0 15 0 4 7 2 3 1
1993 RUS GRG 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 2 2 1 3
1997 RUS GRG 0 1 2 14 14 0 2 0 6 1 1 3
1999 RUS AZE 0 1 2 15 0 15 0 2 7 4 3 1
1998 RUS NOR 0 1 4 15 0 15 0 2 7 4 3 1
1996 RUS TUR 0 0 4 16 0 16 0 1 5 3 3 1
2000 RUS TUR 1 0 4 16 17 17 4 4 5 3 3 1
1994 RUS AFG 0 0 4 16 16 0 4 0 5 3 1 3
1993 RUS CHN 0 1 4 15 0 15 0 4 7 3 3 1
1994 RUS CHN 0 1 4 16 0 16 0 4 5 3 3 1
1993 RUS JPN 0 1 4 15 16 7 1 4 5 3 1 3
1996 RUS JPN 0 1 4 15 15 0 1 0 4 1 1 3
2000 RUS JPN 1 1 4 16 16 0 2 0 5 3 1 3
2000 LIT EQG 0 0 4 15 0 15 0 2 7 1 3 1
1993 ARM AZE 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
Continued on the next page
36
Table 1 – continued from the previous page
Year Country A Country B Joint Dem. Contig. Allied FirstAct High.Act.A High.Act.B Rev.TypeA Rev.TypeB Outcome Settle RoleA RoleB
1996 ARM AZE 0 1 2 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
1998 ARM AZE 0 1 2 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
2000 ARM AZE 0 1 2 16 16 0 1 0 5 3 1 3
2001 ARM AZE 0 1 16 16 0 1 0 5 3 1 3
1994 ARM IRN 0 1 4 16 16 0 4 0 5 3 1 3
2001 NOR AUL 1 0 15 0 15 0 4 5 3 3 1
1993 MLI NIR 1 1 1 17 17 17 2 2 5 3 3 1
2000 BEN NIG 0 1 1 14 0 14 0 1 5 3 3 1
1993 NIR CHA 0 1 4 17 17 17 4 4 8 3 3 1
1996 CDI GUI 0 1 1 14 0 14 0 1 5 3 3 1
1993 CDI NIG 0 0 1 17 17 17 2 2 8 3 3 1
2001 GUI SIE 0 1 16 16 11 2 2 5 3 1 3
2001 LBR SIE 0 1 15 0 15 0 4 7 4 3 1
1997 SIE NIG 0 0 1 14 17 17 3 3 1 2 3 1
1995 CAO NIG 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
1996 CAO NIG 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
1998 CAO NIG 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
2001 CAO CEN 0 1 14 0 14 0 1 5 3 3 1
1995 NIG CHA 0 1 4 14 14 0 1 0 5 3 1 3
1993 CON DRC 0 1 4 15 0 15 0 4 7 1 3 1
1997 CON DRC 0 1 4 16 0 16 0 0 5 3 3 1
1995 CON ANG 0 1 4 17 17 17 4 4 5 3 3 1
1997 CON ANG 0 1 4 17 17 17 3 3 1 3 3 1
1996 DRC RWA 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
1998 DRC RWA 0 1 4 17 20 20 2 2 5 3 1 3
1994 DRC ZAM 0 1 4 14 14 0 0 0 3 4 1 3
1999 UGA RWA 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 1 1 3
2000 UGA RWA 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 1 1 3
1994 UGA SUD 0 1 4 15 17 17 2 2 5 3 1 3
1999 KEN ETH 0 1 1 17 17 17 2 2 6 1 3 1
1998 ETH ERI 0 1 4 17 20 17 1 1 6 1 3 1
Continued on the next page
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Table 1 – continued from the previous page
Year Country A Country B Joint Dem. Contig. Allied FirstAct High.Act.A High.Act.B Rev.TypeA Rev.TypeB Outcome Settle RoleA RoleB
1994 ETH SUD 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
1997 ETH SUD 0 1 4 17 17 17 2 2 5 3 1 3
1996 ERI SUD 0 1 4 17 17 17 2 2 6 1 1 3
1997 ERI YEM 0 1 4 15 15 0 1 0 5 3 1 3
1999 ERI YEM 0 1 4 15 15 0 2 0 8 4 1 3
2001 ANG ZAM 0 1 16 16 16 1 2 8 4 1 3
1993 SUD EGY 0 1 1 15 15 0 1 0 5 3 1 3
1994 SUD EGY 0 1 1 15 15 0 1 0 5 3 1 3
1995 SUD EGY 0 1 1 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 3 1
1996 SUD EGY 0 1 1 16 0 16 0 1 5 3 3 1
1996 IRN TUR 0 1 4 16 0 16 0 2 5 3 3 1
1999 IRN TUR 0 1 4 16 0 16 0 2 5 3 3 1
1993 IRN IRQ 0 1 4 16 16 12 2 2 5 3 1 3
1994 IRN IRQ 0 1 4 16 16 0 2 0 5 3 1 3
1996 IRN IRQ 0 1 4 16 16 11 2 2 5 3 1 3
1997 IRN IRQ 0 1 4 16 16 15 2 2 5 3 1 3
1999 IRN IRQ 0 1 4 16 16 0 2 0 5 3 1 3
1998 IRN AFG 0 1 4 15 17 17 3 2 5 4 3 1
1999 IRN AFG 0 1 4 16 16 0 3 0 5 3 1 3
1995 TUR IRQ 0 1 4 14 14 0 0 0 5 3 1 3
1999 TUR IRQ 0 1 4 14 14 0 2 0 5 3 1 3
2001 TUR IRQ 0 1 16 16 0 2 0 5 3 1 3
1993 IRQ KUW 0 1 1 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
1996 IRQ KUW 0 1 1 16 17 17 1 1 5 3 3 1
1997 SAU YEM 0 1 1 17 17 17 1 1 8 3 1 3
1999 TAJ UZB 0 1 2 16 0 16 0 4 5 3 3 1
1999 KYR UZB 0 1 2 14 0 14 0 4 5 3 3 1
1999 CHN MON 0 1 4 16 16 0 4 0 5 3 1 3
1995 CHN TAW 0 1 4 16 0 16 0 1 5 3 3 1
1993 CHN PRK 0 1 1 17 17 17 2 2 5 3 3 1
1995 CHN PRK 0 1 1 16 0 16 0 4 5 3 3 1
Continued on the next page
38
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Year Country A Country B Joint Dem. Contig. Allied FirstAct High.Act.A High.Act.B Rev.TypeA Rev.TypeB Outcome Settle RoleA RoleB
1997 CHN PRK 0 1 1 17 17 17 4 4 8 3 3 1
1995 CHN PHI 0 0 4 15 15 15 1 1 5 3 1 3
2001 PRK JPN 0 0 17 17 17 1 0 5 3 3 1
1999 ROK JPN 1 1 4 15 0 15 0 2 7 3 3 1
1993 IND PAK 1 1 2 17 17 20 1 1 5 3 3 1
2000 IND PAK 0 1 2 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
2001 IND PAK 0 1 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 3 1
1995 IND BNG 1 1 2 17 17 17 4 4 5 3 3 1
1999 MYA THI 0 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
2001 MYA THI 0 1 17 17 17 2 2 5 3 1 3
1995 THI DRV 0 0 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 3 1
1996 CAM DRV 0 1 4 14 11 14 1 1 1 2 3 1
1999 DRV PHI 0 0 4 16 16 0 1 0 5 3 1 3
2000 PHI PAL 1 0 4 16 0 16 0 2 5 3 3 1
2001 INS NEW 1 0 17 17 17 2 2 5 3 3 1
1993 PNG SOL 1 1 4 17 17 17 1 1 5 3 1 3
1996 PNG SOL 1 1 4 16 16 16 1 1 5 3 1 3
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Table 2: Determinants of Direct Escalation
(1)
Ordered MID Level
Ordered MID Level
(No MID=0, MID w/o Direct Escalation=1, Direct Escalation=2)
Contiguity 1.30∗∗∗
(0.046)
Territory 2.09∗∗∗
(0.11)
Joint Democracy -0.39∗∗∗
(0.054)
Joint Satisfaction -0.046
(0.093)
Both Minors -0.73∗∗∗
(0.055)
Power Preponderance -1.23∗∗∗
(0.13)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.17∗∗
(0.077)
Total GDPperCap of Dyads 0.0060∗∗∗
(0.0020)
PeaceYears -0.067∗∗∗
(0.0039)
PeaceYears Sq 0.0011∗∗∗
(0.000086)
PeaceYeara Cube -4.30∗∗∗
(0.44)
Cut1 0.73∗∗∗
(0.13)
Cut2 1.52∗∗∗
(0.14)
N 137455
Chi-Squared 3093.7
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3: Selection Models of Dispute Onset and Escalation (Reciprocated)
(1) (2)
w/ Direct Escalations w/o Direct Escalations
Escalation (Reciprocated)
Joint Democracy -0.24 -0.42∗
(0.17) (0.23)
Joint Satisfaction 0.34∗ 0.68∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.24)
Power Preponderance 0.27 0.80
(0.47) (0.60)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.37∗∗ 0.56∗∗
(0.18) (0.25)
Constant 0.083 -0.051
(0.39) (0.55)
Onset
Contiguity 1.47∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.058)
Both Minors -0.74∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.065)
Joint Democracy -0.16∗∗∗ -0.097
(0.052) (0.059)
Joint Satisfaction -0.030 -0.11
(0.066) (0.081)
Power Preponderance -1.06∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.18)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.14∗ 0.059
(0.073) (0.093)
PeaceYears -0.052∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0049)
PeaceYears Sq 0.00079∗∗∗ 0.00075∗∗∗
(0.000090) (0.00010)
PeaceYears Cube -3.08∗∗∗ -2.77∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.50)
Constant -1.15∗∗∗ -1.01∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17)
Rho -0.34∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.15)
N 158397 158268
Censored 158053 158053
Uncensored 344 215
Chi-Squared 11.5 18.5
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
41
Table 4: Selection Models of Dispute Onset and Escalation (Use of Force)
(1) (2)
w/ Direct Escalations w/o Direct Escalations
Escalation (Use of Force)
Joint Democracy -0.35∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.29)
Joint Satisfaction 0.30 0.45∗
(0.18) (0.26)
Power Preponderance 0.35 0.15
(0.46) (0.67)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.54∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗
(0.19) (0.27)
Constant 0.40 -0.21
(0.38) (0.61)
Onset
Contiguity 1.47∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.059)
Both Minors -0.75∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.066)
Joint Democracy -0.16∗∗∗ -0.097
(0.052) (0.059)
Joint Satisfaction -0.030 -0.11
(0.066) (0.081)
Power Preponderance -1.06∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.18)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.14∗ 0.057
(0.073) (0.093)
PeaceYears -0.052∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0049)
PeaceYears Sq 0.00080∗∗∗ 0.00074∗∗∗
(0.000090) (0.00010)
PeaceYears Cube -3.13∗∗∗ -2.75∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.50)
Constant -1.15∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17)
Rho -0.33∗∗∗ -0.27∗
(0.098) (0.16)
N 158397 158268
Censored 158053 158053
Uncensored 344 215
Chi-Squared 17.6 13.8
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 5: Selection Models of Dispute Onset and Escalation (Mutual Use of
Force)
(1) (2)
w/ Direct Escalations w/o Direct Escalations
Escalation (Mutual Use of Force)
Joint Democracy -0.26 -0.84∗∗
(0.19) (0.37)
Joint Satisfaction 0.014 0.54∗
(0.20) (0.29)
Power Preponderance 0.25 1.31
(0.53) (0.81)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.36∗ 0.38
(0.20) (0.31)
Constant -0.53 -1.16
(0.44) (0.76)
Onset
Contiguity 1.47∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.058)
Both Minors -0.74∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.066)
Joint Democracy -0.16∗∗∗ -0.096
(0.052) (0.059)
Joint Satisfaction -0.031 -0.11
(0.066) (0.081)
Power Preponderance -1.06∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.18)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.14∗ 0.054
(0.073) (0.093)
PeaceYears -0.052∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0049)
PeaceYears Sq 0.00079∗∗∗ 0.00074∗∗∗
(0.000090) (0.00010)
PeaceYears Cube -3.07∗∗∗ -2.74∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.49)
Constant -1.15∗∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17)
Rho -0.22∗ -0.45∗∗
(0.11) (0.21)
N 158397 158268
Censored 158053 158053
Uncensored 344 215
Chi-Squared 5.19 10.9
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 6: Selection Models of Dispute Onset and Escalation (Fatality>0)
(1) (2)
w/ Direct Escalations w/o Direct Escalations
Escalation (Fatalities¿0)
Joint Democracy -0.76∗∗∗ -1.55∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.48)
Joint Satisfaction -0.23 0.23
(0.21) (0.31)
Power Preponderance 0.35 0.45
(0.54) (0.81)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.31 0.39
(0.20) (0.32)
Constant -0.73 -1.07
(0.45) (0.73)
Onset
Contiguity 1.47∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.059)
Both Minors -0.75∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.066)
Joint Democracy -0.16∗∗∗ -0.096
(0.052) (0.059)
Joint Satisfaction -0.032 -0.11
(0.066) (0.081)
Power Preponderance -1.07∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.18)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.14∗ 0.055
(0.073) (0.093)
PeaceYears -0.052∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0049)
PeaceYears Sq 0.00079∗∗∗ 0.00073∗∗∗
(0.000091) (0.00010)
PeaceYears Cube -3.06∗∗∗ -2.68∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.50)
Constant -1.14∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17)
Rho -0.049 -0.060
(0.11) (0.18)
N 158397 158268
Censored 158053 158053
Uncensored 344 215
Chi-Squared 18.5 11.6
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 7: Selection Models of Dispute Onset and Escalation (Fatality>250)
(1) (2)
w/ Direct Escalations w/o Direct Escalations
Escalation (Fatalities¿250)
Joint Democracy -1.00∗∗∗ -5.15
(0.32) (538.7)
Joint Satisfaction -0.12 0.55
(0.26) (0.37)
Power Preponderance 1.07 0.76
(0.70) (1.08)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.37 0.13
(0.23) (0.43)
Constant -1.75∗∗∗ -2.43∗∗∗
(0.57) (0.93)
Onset
Contiguity 1.47∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.059)
Both Minors -0.75∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.066)
Joint Democracy -0.16∗∗∗ -0.095
(0.052) (0.059)
Joint Satisfaction -0.032 -0.11
(0.066) (0.081)
Power Preponderance -1.07∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.18)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.14∗ 0.055
(0.073) (0.093)
PeaceYears -0.052∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0049)
PeaceYears Sq 0.00079∗∗∗ 0.00072∗∗∗
(0.000090) (0.00010)
PeaceYears Cube -3.07∗∗∗ -2.64∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.50)
Constant -1.14∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17)
Rho -0.087 0.16
(0.14) (0.23)
N 158397 158268
Censored 158053 158053
Uncensored 344 215
Chi-Squared 14.9 3.15
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 8: Selection Models of Dispute Onset and Escalation (Fatality>999 or
War)
(1) (2)
w/ Direct Escalations w/ Direct Escalations
Escalation (War)
Joint Democracy -0.42 -30.7
(0.44) (.)
Joint Satisfaction 0.77∗∗ 1.32∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.47)
Power Preponderance 1.87 1.23
(1.24) (1.61)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) -5.21 -7.65
(1077.8) (.)
Constant -3.34∗∗∗ -3.48∗∗
(1.04) (1.36)
Onset
Contiguity 1.47∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.059)
Both Minors -0.75∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.066)
Joint Democracy -0.16∗∗∗ -0.096
(0.052) (0.059)
Joint Satisfaction -0.032 -0.11
(0.066) (0.081)
Power Preponderance -1.07∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.18)
Allied(Defense Pact=1) 0.14∗ 0.055
(0.073) (0.093)
PeaceYears -0.052∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0049)
PeaceYears Sq 0.00079∗∗∗ 0.00072∗∗∗
(0.000091) (0.00010)
PeaceYears Cube -3.06∗∗∗ -2.65∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.50)
Constant -1.13∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.17)
Rho -0.060 0.17
(0.24) (0.37)
N 158397 158268
Censored 158053 158053
Uncensored 344 215
Chi-Squared 7.93 .
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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